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RICHARD BowNAS

THE NEPALESE MAOIST MovEMENT IN CoMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE: LEARNING FROM THE H ISTORY OF
NAXALISM IN INDIA
This paper compares the contempo rary Maoist movement in Nepa l with th e Naxa lite movem elll
in Indi a, from 1967 to the pre se nt. Th e pape r tou c hes on three main areas: the two move mems'
amb ig u ous relation ship to ethnicit y, th e hi storie s o f prior 'tradition a l' m obili zation that bo th m ovem ent s drew on, and the relati onship b etween vanguard a nd ma ss movement in both cases . The fir st
a im o f th e pape r is to sho w how th e Naxa lite move me m h as trans formed itself ove r the last 35 years
and how its militar y ta cti cs and orga nizationa l· form ha ve c h anged . I th en as k wh eth er Nepal's lvla oists more close ly resemble th e ea rli er pha se of Naxa li s m , in which the lead ers hip h ad broad popular
app eal and work ed close ly with it s peasa nt base, o r its late r phase, in whi ch th e leaders hip became
di se ngage d fr om its base and adopted urban 'terror ' tactics. The paper end s with so m e s pec ulation s
as to wh e re the lV!aoi st movement in Nepa l is headin g, base d on th e co mparisons made earli e r.

INTRODUCTION

This paper places the lvlaoist movement of Nepal
in historical context with the Naxalite movement
in India. I am certainly not claiming that the future
of the Maoists can be read in the evolution of the
Naxalites. Rather, the paper highlights aspects of the
thirty-year history of Naxalite revolt in India that
parallel the current Maoist insurgency in Nepal. My
hope is that an analysis of India's Naxa lite movement
will provide scholars with insights that can guide future research on the 1v!aoist movement in Nepal.
Social movements are rarely if ever unified, homogeneous phenomena. 1 The Naxalite movement in
India is no exception and this is p erhaps the most
valuable lesson the comparison can teach us: while
the Maoist movement in Nepal may superficially
appear ideologically united and highly organized
around common goals , it arose from particul ar historical events that affected specific peoples at certain
identifiable places 2 Examining the Naxalite movement from the longer perspective its history provides
may allow us to identify these local and historically'
grounded roots of rural insurgency and use the insights this perspective provides to analyze the case
of Nepal.
In this paper I will not address another important
issue: the direct connections between Naxalism and
Nepal 's 't•/laobaadi, in terms of resource sharing, mil-

itary training and ideological borrowing. This could
be the topic for a different strand of research .
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NAXALITE MOVEMENT

To understand the events and processes that have
come to be termed 'Naxalism' l w11l first present a
'top clown' account of the educated leadership of
the movement and their ideological splits, and then
make a 'bottom up' analysis of the experiences and
beliefs of the peasant supporters 3
The 'top down' hi story of the movement would
begin with the series of splits that affected the Indian communist movement in the 1950s and 60s: a
fragmentation of the Left that parallels Nepal's. The
main ideologica l argument was between those communists who imitated the success of the Congress
Party by se tting up patron client networks to ensure
electoral success at the regional level , and those communists who chose the lvlaoist-inspirecl approach of
revolution in the countryside, followed by the enc irclement and capture of the cities.
. The "revisionist" electoral path to power advocated
by the pro-Soviet Communist Party of India had induced its more radical members to form the Maoist-oriented Communist Party (Ma rxist), or CPI ('tvl)
in the 1950s. By the late 1960s, when the Naxalbari
unrest began , this more revolutionary party fa ced
new internal divisions. The CPI (M) had entered into
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a new coalition government in Bengal with the CPI and was
keen to preserve its nevv institutional status. The more revolutionary elements of the CPI (M) broke off in 1969 to form
the CPI (Marxist Leninist), the party most closely associated
with the Naxalite revolt. This newest party was dominated
by the forceful, some would say Stalinist, personality of CPI
(ML) leader and propagandist, 4 Charu Mazumdar. Mazumdar's domination of the CPI (ML) conveys the impression that
the Naxalite movements which allied themselves with the
CPI (ML) were under the CPI (ML)'s control, but at no time
did one party, leader, or organization have overall control of
events 5
The Naxalite movement began in 1967 at Naxalbari, near
Siliguri in West Bengal. After
the police had beaten and
raped women of the tribal
"Santal" group, Santal peasants and tea plantation laborers revolted and were joined
by some non tribal lower and
middle peasants. The actions
undertaken included the execution of landlords, redistribution of grain, and the
destruction of land deeds. Although this was a short-lived,
locally based movement, it
was immediately claimed
by the CPI (ML) as part of
its revolutionary project and
was publicized by China's Peoples' Daily, which declared in a
headline that "Spring Thunder is breaking over India." But an
Indian revolution did not follow. Instead, the Naxalbari revolt
was crushed after just four months by police.
Nevertheless, the Naxalite revolt provided a model that
was imitated in a sporadic fashion across India's "tribal belt,"
her northern and eastern states. The greatest success came
in Srikakulam, Anclhra Pradesh, where the 'Girijans,' another
tribal people, were able to form a longer lasting movement.
I will discuss the reasons why particular regions were more
successful than others in organizing later in this paper.
By 1969, with most of the attempted rural uprisings weakening and cadres not able to inspire mass support, Naxalite
tactics changed. Those movements, under the influence of
Charu Mazumclar, started a program of 'class anni~ilation'
and covert assassination coordinated by an influx of CPI (ML)
students from Calcutta .
This emphasis on terror reached itspeak in 1970-71 vvhen
the assassination program moved into Calcutta itself6 'vVhen
the police cracked clown in Calcutta, they killed as many as
5,000 supporters, most in extra judicial fashion. By 1972
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Na xalism appeared to be a thing of history and its leader,
Mazumclar, was dead.
However, the movement had an afterlife. After surviving a
few years underground , the end of the 'emergency' period in
the late 1970s allowed Naxalite-inspirecl movements to reemerge in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. This has been the pattern since: as repression increases the movements disappear
only to emerge when conditions relax, as for example during
the early 1990s when the Congress went though a period of
internal fractiousness allowing the "Maoist Communist Center" to rise up in Andhra and the "Peoples' War Group" to
attack landlords in Bihar.
The focus of the more recent movements has been less
ambitious, because revolutionaries realize that they
cannot realistically seize
control of the state. However, Naxalite groups do
exercise effective power
over millions of Indians in
the Telengana and Dandakaranya regions of Andhra
and in large parts of anarchic southern Bihar. They
have had strong enough
support from 'clalit' ('untouchable')
populations
and from tribal peoples to
establish local 'administrations' that perform many
governmental functions that the state has failed to do in rural
India.
"OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS" AS CAUSE OF REVOLT?

Can the Naxalite revolt be explained by "objective" class
conditions in the Indian countryside? The Naxalites, in language prefiguring Nepal 's Maoists, claimed they were fighting
a vvar against 'semi-feudal, semi-capitalist forces,' and that the
objective nature of exploitation in the countryside, with its
combination of pre-capitalist bondage and capitalist market
relations, was impoverishing and abusing the poor majority
and inducing them to revolt.
Clearly, objective economic conditions contribute towards
revolt. Routledge (1997) identifies five main variables in his
analysis of the Naxalite movement:
l. Land inequality in which the bottom 50% of households
controlled just 9% of available agricultural land by the early
1970's.

2. Underemployment of landless laborers leading them to
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Lake loans at exorbitant rates of interest.
3. Harvest failures in 1965 -67, just before the Naxalbari
revolt began, which were exacerbated by a cut in US food aid
in 1966.
4. The unequal regional impacts of the Green Revolution,
whose benefits were concentrated in the wheat-producing
areas .
5. Urban recession, which hit West Bengal especially hard
and thereby made unemployed student activists available to
the CPI (ML).
However, this list of variables fails to provide a complete
explanation. Most social scientists long ago abandoned as
over-simple explanations for contentious politics that posit
changes in economic situation as adequate incentive for revolts. Such conditions applied over large swathes of Northern
and Eastern India, but Naxalite revolts only emerged in a few
places.
In an article in India's Economic and Political Weekly in
December 1982 Alice Thorner critically examined a large
number of Marxist analyses of the "objective conditions" of
the rural poor in India, many of which had sought to explain
Naxalite violence. Thorner found that issues of caste and
consciousness had been largely overlooked, as these scholars
mechanistically attempted to place Indian peasants into class
groupings and to explain their political behaviors as the result of their class position.
Thorner concluded that we must go beyond economic reductionism and examine the connections between ethnicity,
social structure, and economics in order to understand phenomena such as the Naxalite movement.
THE ETHNIC ROOTS OF NAXALISM

Naxalite rebellions were most enduring in the hill areas of
West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh, where tribal peoples are
concentrated. The history of the Santals in West Bengal and
of the Girijans in Andhra is a crucial part of the history of
Naxalism that might cast some light on the 'ethnic' character
of Maoism in Nepal.
Calman (1985) describes hovv the Girijans in Andhra
suffered in the 1960's from increasing state incursions into
communal forests. Traditional users of forest resources found
themselves restricted in their access by state appointed forest guards. Accompanying this threat to communal re.s ources
was the more general monetization of social relation s in 'the
countryside, whichh had disproportionately negative consequences for tribal peoples, who found themselves increasingly
in debt to money lenders in order to preserve their standard
of living. The Girijans did not have access to the patronage
networks and party officials of the Congress or CPL They had
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no state officials who would intercede on their behalf when it
came to lega l battles over land tenure or usurious debts. It was
in this context of imperiled communal life that Maoist cadres
were able to mobilize tribal people to resist threats to their
communities in ways described in the following section.
In West Bengal analyses from Mukherjee (1987) and
Duyker (1987) shows a different pattern of exclusion of tribal
peoples, but with similar consequences. Here, Santal peoples
(previously semi-sedentary slash-and-burn agriculturalists)
had been imported into the area by the British in order to
work on the tea plantations. Like the Giryans, the Santals remained outside of the reciprocity networks of the Hindu community. This, according to Mukherjee, gave them a peculiar
sense of class exploitation, as compared to those Hindu peasants who were included in a system of noblesse oblige. They
were therefore more liable to be mobilized along class lines by
Maoist cadres, who, in Duyker's analysis, adeptly used ethnic
symbolism to unite them.
In the case of both Girijans and Santals, ethnic outsider
status made these groups fertile ground for mobilization, but
it is important to bear in mind the differences: the Girijans
were resisting state incursion onto communal land, whereas
the Santals were already partly proletarianized wage laborers
who were mobilized around communal tribal motifs.
Parallels to Nepal's Maoist affected areas are not straightforward . In Nepal, too, ethnic outsiders have become increasingly impoverished and lack access to state-sponsored sources of
jobs and money; in Nepal, too, Maoists have used collective
ethnic identities to mobilize villagers. However, patterns of
exploitation differ, with ethnic groups in Nepal having longer
histories of tributary relations with the state. Research may
help to show whether Nepal's Maoism has been organized
around the struggle for ethnic autonomy over resources what
Routledge (1997) terms the 'ethno ecological' aspects of
insurgency to the same degree as Indian Maoism.
NAXALISM AND PRE-EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURES OF
RESISTANCE

So far I have briefly discussed the e-::onomic crises and conditions that preceded Naxalism and the reason that ethnic
minorities were most likely to participate in revolt. However,
I have not said much about the actual organization of the
Naxalite movements, specifically, the structure of the movement and the symbolic tools its leaders used to inspire peasants to undertake the enormous physical risk of revolt . We
need to know how the costs of action were reduced. Naxalite
movements lasted longest and had the most social impact in
those areas where there was a pre-existing infrastructure of
resistance and where memories of historical battles against
the state could be drawn upon by leaders to make symbolic
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appeals.
ln Naxalbari, local-level communist cadres had been working with Santa! tribes since 1951, a full sixteen years before
the actual revolt 7 These cadres had integrated th emselves
into local communities, even marrying Santa! women. The
strategy at this point had been one of community building
and raising consciousness rather than revolutionary action .
. ln Srikakulam, Andhra Pradesh, Caiman (1985) describes a
similar story, where Communal units called 'sanghams' were
built up at the village-level by communist cadres living in the
community. These units acted to protect local communities
from state attempts to commandeer communal resources , to
intercede on their behalf with the courts, and to protect communities from landlord I police incursions. As in Naxalbari
these communist leaders were working on a mainly local basis, and the issues that they pursued were chosen mainly by
the communities they worked with.
These leadership or 'va nguard ' groups (to use the favored
revolutionary term) were embedded in the communities with
whom they worked. Although these leaders were clearly trying to create a form of class consciousness in the countryside,
they realized that issues of class were inextricably bound up
with ethnicity and with the demand for cultural and ecological preservation .
Ranajit Guha (1983) in his classic work on peasant insurgencies in nineteenth century India describes hovv 'territoriality,' that is, the commitment to a local place, and 'solidarity,'
or kinship ties, were the binding factors behind insurgencies
against the British colonialists. Actions like looting, the burning of documents , and the redistribution of grain which were
typical of the initial stage of the Naxalite revolt and of their
earlier antecedents. These were not lV!aoist innovations, but,
like Maoism itself, were partly rooted in ancient forms of
peasant resistance .
For Guha, these traditional forms of insurgency stand on
the boundary between a 'conservative' attempt to maintain
community (which might be led by tribal elites) and a more
radical sense of class consciousness, through which peasants
begin to see connections between their plight and that of others similarly placed in the productive process.
Indeed, there is a direct link between some of the rebellions
Guha analyzes and the Naxalbari revolts. A tribal group, the
"Hul ," had revolted against the Briti sh in the 1850s. The Santals had preserved stor ies of the Hul revolt in their oral traditions , so they were able to draw on knowledge of these revolts
to motivate their cadres (Duyker, 1987). Duyker shows how
Naxalite leaders drew on such oral histories and incorporate
them into their tactics . For example, the cadres who led the
1967 uprising deliberately encouraged the use of traditional
bows and arrows , despite their impracticality, in order to keep
warriors conscious of their ethnic group's long term connec-
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tions to the land.
Historical legacies also help account for the success of the
movement in Telengana, Anclhra Pradesh, where not only the
memory, but the very leaders of the Telengana revolt of the
1940s vvere still alive and active in the new movement. ln
sum, the Maoist action in rural India before the late 1960s
involved a careful balance between progressive politics and
traditional demands for conservation of community and resources.
THE DEMISE AND REVIVAL OF NAXALISM: 1975-2000

Until about 1969 the relationship between the peasants
and the CPI (ML) vanguard was one of cooperation and symbiosis. In 1969, under the direction of CPI (ML) leader Charu
Mazumclar and an elite of West Bengali intellectuals the direction of the movement changed. Mazumdar tried to revolutionize the peasantry using the strategy of class annihilation:
Once an area is liberated from the clutches of class enemies
the state is deprived of its eyes and ears in the village .. . the
political units [i.e., the vanguard] raises the slogan "seize the
crops of the class enemy" and even the most backward peasants join the battle. The state does not sit idly by however.
The police raid the villages and small guerilla squads now annihilate class enemies as well as the reactionary police force .
The annihilation campaign will bring into the hands of the
guerilla force the modern weapons of the reactionary state
machinery. 8
This tactic temporarily seemed to succeed in Srikakulam
(Ram 1971, pll7), but the success was primarily due to traditional mass mobilization I resistance techniques employed by
Nagi Reddy, the senior Maoist leader 9 in Andhra who opposed
Mazumdar's 'annihilation line.' In fact, the 'annihilation line'
brought clown the full force of state repression on the peasantry, a disaster which undermined the links between vanguard and mass movement.
From 1969, Mazumdar relied on urban students from petit
bourgeois backgrounds to lead secret assassination squads in
the countryside. The open, mass assaults peasants had made
to defend their home territories gave way to a secret campaign
of assassination carried out mainly by outsiders. Guha (1983)
notes these tactics have little or no value in raising consciousness and are poor organizing tools . Despite the stated aim of
making peasants aware of the repressive power of the state,
this tactic was regressive. The movement had abandoned its
roots in the local in favor of increasingly nihilistic and secretive violence against individuals. The movement had lost its
way.
The history of Naxalism did not, however, end in 1971.
Rather, the movements survived by returning to the local as
the source of their power. The Naxalite-inspired movements
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th al survive in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh are based mainly on
'iclenlily politics,' 10 in other words on claims not directly connec ted to econom ic struggle. In the 1980s and1990s issues of
aste, ethnici ty, gender, and environmental preservation have
been used more frequently in their propaganda. Naxalism in
Bihar has been in strumental in promoting caste-based militias to protect lower caste groups from upper caste violence.
Th ~ 'protection' of forest resources has also been a vital tool
in attracting the support of tribal communities.

cient in the areas they control. Local people in Naxalite-affected regions may sometimes complain that "Naxal Raj is no
better than police Raj,'' but in the absence of state protection
they have little choice but to pay the 'taxes' required and receive the limited services and advocacy that the Naxalites can
provide.

The economic side of this localism is that the Naxalites
are firmly rooted in the loca l economy as quasi- enterprises
or mini-states. They dem and protection money/taxation from
vill agers and in return provid e protection from landlord/police violence, bas ic com munity se rvices such as clean water
and elementar y education , and
develo pment loan s like a micro
finance NGO. This new fo cus
on the local and the marginalized has won Naxa lism support
among India's human rights
community. Naxa lites are seen
almost as fellow travelers with
anti-dam campaigners and environmentalists.

The history of the Naxalite movement shows that the vanguard and mass movement can be in very different relations
with each other at different times and places, despite the superficial appearance of ideological uniformity. The question is
important for the way we view insurgencies and for the policy
approaches we take to deal with
them. At the risk of simplification, there are three possible
types of vanguard/mass movement relation:

There is another side to this
localism , however. V/ith the
abandonment of attempts to
'scale up' the movement or to
appeal to broader constituencies, the Naxalite groups have b ecome enmeshed in profitable
loca l activities such as the sale of tendu lea f and bamboo from
the forests, or trade in the mineral bau xite. Profits from these
activities now exceed earnings from more traditional fundraising acti vities such as looting from banks and rich landlords. According to some sources, profits are being reinvested
in the drugs trade and other, more legitimate businesses. In
Bihar this 'economism' h as brought the two leading Naxalite
operations , the 1vlao ist Comm and Center and the Peoples'
War Group (P\-\IG), into conn ict over territory. Some reports
in the Indian press also point to collusion between Naxalite
groups and local politi cian s. For example , Naxalite leaders
may have made deals with local BJP parties to en sure that
elections are boyco tted. Guerrillas h ave also been hired out
as mercenaries.
As contemporary Naxalism has entrenched itself in the
loca l economies, state officials may have little incentive to
launch a full scale offensive against their strongholds b ecause
. the sta te may not be able to provide the basic services that the
Naxalites offer. The Naxa lites themselves have little incentive to expand their aims or try to form progt:essive coalitions
with other groups, because they are economicaliy self-suffi-

APPLYING INSIGHTS FROM THE NAXALITE MOVEMENT
TO NEPAL

l. The vanguard is aloof from
the masses it claims to represent. Tactics tend to involve
secret killings directed by elite
groups from geographically
distant locations. Political discourse tends to be abstract and
removed from local culture.
Mass action and consciousness
raising and education take second place to territorial expansion. Naxalism in the late 1960s
under Mazumdar's leadership approximates this type.
2. The vanguard is responsive to the mass movement and
its leaders, and, if not actually from the local community, the
vanguard members have strong personal ties to local communities. Action is primarily directed to raising consciousness and building the strength of the community, though
with longer term strategic ends in mind. Violence tends to be
characterized by 'resistance' to external threats rather than
territorial expansion. Local history and culture inform the
political discourse. Pre-Naxalite communist activities in Bengal and Andhra Pradesh approximate this type, or that part of
the movement (in Andhra) led by Nagi Reddy.
3. The vanguard enters into a symbiotic relationship with
the local. The movement becomes fragmented into regional or
even village-level movements. No attempt is made to expand
the area of action; consciousness raising is not attempted.
Political discourse takes on an ethnic coloring, possibly in
an exclusivist manner. Violence may be directed against rival
factions over territorial control, but is sporadic and mainly
justified as "resistance". The main aim of the movement is
survival, with larger political ambitions abandoned. The con-
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temporary Naxalite movement may approx imate this type.
Why do movements end up in one type or change from one
type to another7 Ideological commitment and the strategy of
particular leaders are obviously a vital part of the explanation, but strategy and ideology are also sh aped by the political and economic resources avail able to the vanguard of the
movement. The process may be determined by the extent to
which the vanguard need the m ass movement to obtain their
end s, and the ways they need it.
In the early 1960s communist cad res worked closely with
local communities and incorporated local histor y
and culture into their political symbolism and tactics.
Why did this change in
the late 1960s? One reason
cou ld be the perception
that the movement would
receive the backing of an
external
power,
China
(based on its praise for the
movement in the 'Chinese
Peoples Daily' in 1967 and
though informal contacts)
The assumption that this
political resource would
become available may have
made Ch aru Mazumdar and
his allies more confident as they pursued their elite-led assassination campaign, which actually was eroding the social
basis of radical politics in the countryside.
In the 1970s it became clear that China would not intervene on behalf of revolutionary movements in India. The
Naxa lite movement now had to return to working with local communities. However, the way they did this was shaped
by the availability of economic resources, in particular those
from the forests. As the ex traction of bamboo and other forest
products became their chief source of income, Naxalite leaders had to cooperate closely with loca l communities to mange
forest product extraction sustainably. The profits from this
forest-based trade are substantial but not enough to allow the
Naxalite leaders to lose their reliance on local cooperation.
Thus, the vanguard h as become bound to the local through
its source of funds.
Here, a comparison with Peru's 'Shining Path' Maoist" movement is informative: Senclero Luminoso, the 'Shining Path,'
funded itself through the coca trade and its choice of strategy
was guided by the need to control coca growing areas. Coca
fetches a high price, Sendero Luminoso leaders accumulated
large profits, and the vanguard of the movement. did not need
to develop strong bonds w ith the local community in order
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to maintain its income stream. The extreme violence of the
'Shin ing Path' must be strongly connected to the high econoniic rewards coca produces and to the need to defend those
rewards by keeping the state and rival groups out of coca pro clueing territory.
So what about Nepal: what vanguard/mass movement relations characterize the Maobaadi? 'vVithout recent direct experience in Maobaadi controlled territory this question can
be addressed better by other authors of this volume. But I
can add ress the factors that are most likely to shape those
relations.
The areas in which the
Maobaadi are strongest are
generally resource poor
compared with Northern
India , let alone Peru . Does
this mean the vanguard
has to work closely with local communities or does it
have the opposite effect of
creating a pure extraction
economy, in which villagers
are expected to hand over
food? In India contemporary Naxalites have tried to
improve local production
PHOTO: T ATSURO FUJ IKURA
and have distributed loans
for development purposes.
In Nepal, in the absence of sustainable sources of income due
to low productivity of the land and the limited number of
banks and landlords to loot, 11 the movement may be led to
political compromise or to increasing violence to try and seize
more productive resources.
The question of the political resources facing the Mao baadi vanguard is also crucial. Unlike the Naxalite leadership, Maobaacli leaders have strong personal connections to
Nepal's high caste elite. This may provide the vanguard with
an incen tive to defect from the mass movemen t (if a mass
movement does indeed ex ist in Nepal) and obtain personal
political rewards instead. 12
CONCLUSIONS

My analysis of the Naxalite movements in India suggests
several key questions to consider regarding the Maobaadi
of Nepal: To what extent is Nepa l's movement 'new' and to
what extent does it draw on pre-existing memories of ethnically conceived struggles? Are there geograph ical var iations
in the degree to which the movement is rooted or embedded
in the locaP Second: what is the relationship of vangu ard to
mass movement7 How does it change from place to place and
through time? Do the tactics of the Maoists resonate with local
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prac ti ces or a re th ey perceived as ex te rnal impositions, orare
th ey so m e s ubt le combination of th e two 7 How do loca l populati o ns pe rceive the Maois ts: as eith e r exte rn a l threat or as a
so lution to loca l problems7 How h ave reso urce needs sh aped
th e re lat ions hip between elite vang u a rd an d loca l mass m oveme nts7 How m ay these rela tionships c h an ge in the future7
The Naxa lite m ove m e nt sh ows that the a n swe rs to these
questions w ill be place sp ecific a nd wi ll have changed over
time. lf th e comparison tells u s anyt hing, it is that a unita r y
approach to the a n a lysis of the Maois t movement is bound to
be un sa tis factor y.

3
l am draw ing on seve ral second ary accounts, especia ll y by
Damas (199 1), Raro (1971), 1vlohant y (1977) and Ray (1988). tvlost
o f th ese acco unts, though not Ray's, are wr illen by sc holars on the
Left who sought to explain defic iencies in the strategy of the Naxa lites th ough ex pressing sy mpathy w ith their broad aim s. India's
Econom ic and Political \'Vee kly is also an important source . tvlohan
Ram's article in the August iss ue of 1972 provides a usefu l ove rview
o f Naxa lism from the perspec ti ve o f the demo cratic left. The Naxalites' own ve rsion of history ca n be accessed on the webs ite of one
of thei r fact ions: www.fas.org/ir p/wo rl d/pa ra/mcc. htm.
4

1vlazumda r's propaga nd a is foun d in th e revolu tionary Indi an
newspa per Liberation in issues between 1968 and 1970.
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ENDNOTES
1

See for example the latest work on social move ment theo ry by
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001).
2

This is also the message that comes ac ross fro m Sara Sh neiclerman's piece in this volume.
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